Statistical properties of an order book and the effect they have on price dynamics were studied using the high-frequency NASDAQ Level II data. It was observed that the size distribution of marketable orders (transaction sizes) has power law tails with an exponent 1 + µ market = 2.4 ± 0.1. The distribution of limit order sizes was found to be consistent with a power law with an exponent close to 2. A somewhat better fit to this distribution was obtained by using a log-normal distribution with an effective power law exponent equal to 2 in the middle of the observed range. The depth of the order book measured as a price impact of a hypothetical large market order was observed to be a non-linear function of its size. A large imbalance in the number of limit orders placed at bid and ask sides of the book was shown to lead to a short term deterministic price change, which is in accord with the law of supply and demand.
As a result of collective efforts by many authors the list of basic "stylized" empirical facts about market price fluctuations has now begun to emerge [1] . It became known that the histogram of short term price fluctuations δp(t) = p(t + δt) − p(t) has "fat" power-law tails: Prob(δp > x) ∼ x −α . The exponent α was measured to be close to 3 in major US markets [2] as well as foreign exchange markets [3] . The other well established empirical fact is that while the sign of δp(t) measured at different times has only short term correlations, its magnitude |δp(t)| (or alternatively its square δp(t)
2 ) has a long term memory as manifested by slowly decaying correlations. The correlation function was successfully fitted by a power law t −γ with a small exponent γ ≃ 0.3 [4, 5] over a rather broad range of times.
Several simplified market models were introduced in an attempt to reproduce and explain this set of empirical facts [6, 7] . The current consensus among econophysicists seems to be that these facts are a manifestation of some kind of strategy herding effect, in which many traders lock into the same pattern of behavior. Large price fluctuations are then explained as a market impact of this coherent collective trading behavior. Any model aiming at understanding price fluctuations needs to define a mechanism for the formation of the price. Here the usual approach is to postulate some empirical (linear or non-linear) market impact function, which reduces calculating prices to knowing the imbalance between the supply of and the demand for the stock at any given time step.
Recently one of us (SM) has introduced a toy model [8] in which the same standard set of stylized facts, albeit with somewhat different critical exponents, was generated in the absence of any strategic behavior on the part of traders. The model uses a rather realistic order-book-based mechanism of price formation, which does not rely on any postulated market impact function. Instead, price fluctuations arise naturally as a result of changes in the balance of orders in the order book. The long memory of individual entries in this book gives rise to fat-tailed price distributions and volatility clustering. Every market has two basic types of orders, which we would refer to as limit and market orders. A limit order to sell (buy) is an instruction to sell (buy) a specified number of shares of a given stock if its price rises above (falls below) a predefined level, which is known as the execution price of a limit order. A market order on the other hand is an instruction to immediately sell (buy) a specified number of shares at whatever price currently available at the market. Here we do not make a distinction between a true market order and a marketable limit order, placed at the inside bid or ask price, and refer to both of them as 'market orders'. The model of Ref. [8] assumes the simplest possible mechanism for the dynamics of individual orders in the order book. At each step a new order is submitted to the market. With equal probabilities this order can be a limit order to sell, a market order to sell, a limit order to buy, or a market order to buy. All orders are of the same unit size, and a new limit order to sell (buy) is placed with a random offset ∆ above (below) the most recent transaction price. In spite of its utmost simplicity the model has a surprisingly rich behavior, which up to now was understood only numerically. The distribution of price fluctuations has power law tails characterized by an exponent α = 2, while the correlation function of absolute values of price increments decays as t −0.5 .
Of course, the dynamics of a real order book is much more complicated than rules of the toy model from Ref. [8] . First of all, in real markets, both market and limit orders come in vastly different sizes and exist for various time frames. Secondly, participants of real markets do use strategies after all. In particular, both under-capitalized speculators and well-capitalized market makers avoid static public display of their willingness to accept a given price, and adjust their limit order size and price regularly. Finally, there is a practically allimportant matter of time delay between the actual state of the order book and whatever a particular trader observes on his/her screen. Prior to electronic data transmission, investors might not know at what price the queue is matching their buy and sell orders until long after the transaction took place. On the other hand, market makers have always had near immediate access to completed transaction data. With modern computerized markets, there is a much shorter delay between a transaction's completion time and trader's awareness of the event, but the delay still exists. The inhomogeneity of those delay times for different market participants contributes to the wide variety of strategies employed by traders.
In this work, we attempt to establish some empirical facts about the statistical properties and dynamics of publicly displayed limit orders using data collected in a real market. The purpose of this analysis is twofold. First of all, these new observations would extend a rather narrow list of stylized facts about real markets. As in other branches of physics (or any other empirical science for that matter) the only way to choose among many competing theoretical models is to make new empirical observations. Since the high frequency data about the state of an order book is much harder to collect than the highly institutionalized record of actual transactions, to our knowledge this investigation was never before attempted by members of the econophysics community. Second, we hope that the study of a real order book dynamics would suggest new realistic ingredients that can be added to a toy model of Ref [8] to improve its agreement with the extended set of stylized facts.
Markets differ from each other in precise rules of submission of orders and the transparency of the order book. In the so-called order-driven markets there are no designated market makers who are required to post orders (quotes) on both bid and ask sides of the order book. Instead the liquidity is provided only by limit orders submitted by individual investors. Versions of this market mechanism are employed in such markets as Toronto Stock Exchange (CATS), Paris Bourse (CAC), Tokyo Stock Exchange, Helsinki Stock Exchange (HETI), Stockholm Stock Exchange (SAX), Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (AMS), New Delhi and Bombay Stock Exchanges, etc. Major US markets use somewhat different systems. In the New York Stock Exchange individual orders are matched by a specialist who does not disclose detailed data regarding the contents of his order book. That reduces the transparency (or openness) of the order book to market participants. The NASDAQ Level II screen is the closest US equivalent to an order book in an order-driven market. Since the contents and dynamics of individual entries on this screen are main subjects of the present work they will be described in greater details later on in the manuscript.
Before we proceed, we would like to put an important disclaimer regarding the terminology used in this paper. To avoid overwhelming our readers by a variety of different financial terms describing similar concepts, in this work, we would refer to any yet unfilled order present in an order book as a 'limit order.' While this is strictly true for an order driven market, using this term to describe a market maker's quote on the NASDAQ Level II screen may seem a bit confusing at first. However, it makes sense in this context. Indeed, both individual limit orders in an order-driven market and market maker's quotes on the NASDAQ Level II screen can be viewed just as commitments to buy (sell) a certain number of shares at a given price should the queuing mechanism match this order with a complement marketable order. The only detail which distinguishes a market maker from a normal trader in an order-driven market is that by NASDAQ rules, the market maker must maintain both buy and sell limit orders, changing price level and volume within domains established by exacting timing rules. But in zero order approximation one can simply forget that these two quotes come from the same source and look at them just as at two individual 'limit orders.'
The other simplification adopted in this work is that we do not make a distinction between a true market order and a marketable limit order, placed at or better than the inside bid or ask price, and refer to both of them as 'market orders'. From this point of view a transaction always happens when a 'market order' (or a marketable limit order) is matched with a previously submitted 'limit order' (or a quote by the market maker). The size of an individual transaction is therefore a good measure of a market (or marketable) order size in our definition.
The real time dynamics of an order book is a fascinating spectacle to watch (see e.g. www.3dstockcharts.com). For frequently traded stocks it is in a state of a constant change. The density of limit orders goes up when more traders select to submit limit orders rather than market (or marketable) orders. In the opposite case of a temporary preponderance of market orders, the book gets noticeably thinner. In addition to these fluctuations in the density and number of limit orders, any serious imbalance in the number limit orders to buy and limit orders to sell near the current price level gives rise to short term deterministic price changes. This change reflects intuitive notions regarding supply and demand. i.e. the price statistically tends to go up in response to an excess number of limit orders to buy and down in the opposite case. It is by observing all of this in real time one understands that the balance of individual orders in the order book is the ultimate source of price fluctuations.
In this work we study the statistical properties of data one of us (MM) collected on the NASDAQ market. Even though NASDAQ is a quote-driven (dealership) market, due to reasons explained above we believe that our study should also apply to order books in order-driven markets. Indeed, many of our conclusions are remarkably similar to those reported for order-driven markets in the recent economic literature [9] . The NASDAQ Level II data for a given stock lists current bid and ask prices and volumes quoted by all market makers and Electronic Communication Networks trading this stock. For example the line: JDSU GSCO K NAS 112.625 500 114.0625 500 can be interpreted as a display of Goldman Sachs'(GSCO) intent to buy 500 shares of JDS Uniphase Corporation (JDSU) at 112.625 per share and sell 500 shares at 114.0625 per share. Each such market maker entry usually conceals a whole secondary order book of limit orders submitted to this market maker by his clients. Those 'outside' bids and asks, i.e. private limit orders at price levels more distant from the publicly displayed 'best' bid or ask, generally remain hidden to most market participants. The concept of second hierarchical level of order books at NASDAQ can be perhaps best illustrated on an example of Electronic Communication Networks (ECN) such as Island (the ECN symbol ISLD). In this case the "hidden" book can be actually viewed (e.g. at the Island's website (www.island.com)), while the only part of this book which is visible at the NASDAQ Level II screen is the highest bid and lowest ask prices and volumes. There they are shown as any other market maker entry: JDSU ISLD O NAS 113.75 200 114 800.
In the course of one trading day we recorded 'snapshots' of the order book for one particular stock at time intervals which are on average 3 seconds apart. We were unable to account for network delay between our 'time stamp' and the actual display time (in the NASDAQ order-matching queue). The delay was generally assumed to be less than a second, but it is known exceed 2 or 3 seconds when high trading volume imposed network delays. This record was subsequently binned by the price, and aggregate volumes at four highest bid prices and lowest ask prices were kept in the file. Due to the discreteness of stock price at NASDAQ several market makers are likely to put their quotes at exactly the same price. In our file we kept only the aggregate volume at a given price, equal to the sum of individual limit orders (quotes) by several market makers. A file collected during a typical trading day contains on average 7000 time points.
The first question we addressed using this data set was: what is the size distribution of limit and market orders? In Fig. 1 we show the cumulative distribution of market (marketable) order sizes (or alternatively the sizes of individual transactions) calculated for all stocks and trading days for which we have collected the data. From our record we know only the total number of traded shares and the total number of transactions which occurred between the two subsequent snapshots of the order book. This average number of transactions per snapshot varies between 3 and 5.5 for different stocks in our data set. The size of a market order used in Fig. 1 was defined simply as the change in the traded volume divided by a small number of transactions that occurred between the two subsequent snapshots of the screen. All our data are consistent with market order sizes being distributed according to a power law P (x) ∼ x −1−µ market with an exponent µ market = 1.4 ± 0.1. In [10] Gopikrishnan et al. have analyzed the distribution of volumes of individual transactions for largest 1000 stocks traded at major US stock markets and arrived at a similar average value for the exponent µ market = 1.53 ± .07 (ξ in their notation). They also plotted the histogram of this exponent measured for different individual stocks (see Fig. 3(b) in Ref. [10] ), showing substantial variations.
The distribution of limit order sizes, to our knowledge, was never analyzed in the literature before. To make the histogram of this distribution we used sizes of limit orders at a particular level in the order book from all snapshots made throughout one trading day. We found that this histogram can be also approximately described by a power law form. The data for different levels of bid and ask prices (level 1 being the highest bid and the lowest ask) for two of our stocks are presented in Figs. 2,3 . In both cases all distributions were found to be consistent with an exponent µ limit = 1.0 ± 0.3. The quality of the power law fit is rather poor though. In fact when we repeated the above analysis using cumulative histograms we saw that a log-normal distribution fits our data over a wider region (see Fig. 4 ). The best fit to a log-normal distribution has similar parameters for different stocks, trading days, and levels in the order book. The best empirical formula for the probability distribution of limit order sizes is thus P (x) = x −1 exp(−(A − ln(x)) 2 /B), with parameters A and B fluctuating around 7 and 4 in all of our data sets. This formula indeed gives the effective power law exponent µ limit = 1 for x ≃ 8000 i.e. near the center of our range.
We next concentrate on calculating the depth of the order book at any given bid and ask level. The depth of the order book is an important measure of the liquidity of the market for a given stock. For a given state of the order book one can measure the total volume (number of shares) N(∆p) of limit orders with execution prices lying within a certain price range ∆p from the middle of the bid/ask spread. The function ∆p(N), which is the functional inverse of N(∆p) can be thought of as a virtual impact that a hypothetical market order of volume N would have on the price of the stock. It is important to emphasize the word virtual here. Indeed, in real markets new limit orders would be immediately submitted by market makers (or speculators in orderdriven markets) in response to the arrival of a large market order. The first step in quantifying the depth of the limit order book is to measure the average price difference between different levels of the book e.g. the average gap between prices of the highest bid and the next highest bid. For both bid and ask sides of the book at all levels the average price gap between levels was measured to be around $0.08 for the JDSU stock traded on July 5, 2000 and $0.12 for the BRCM stock traded on July 3, 2000. The average bid-ask spread (i.e. the difference between the lowest ask and the highest bid prices) was measured to be some 10-20% smaller than the average gap between two levels on the same side of the book. Also in both data sets that we analyzed, gaps on the ask (limit orders to sell) side seem to be some 5-10% higher than on the bid (limit orders to buy) side. It is not clear if that was just a trading day artifact or a sign of some real asymmetry. More interesting behavior was observed for the average size of a limit order as a function of the level of the order book. The average size is at its maximum at the level 1 of the book (highest bid/lowest ask) and gradually falls off with the level number (see Fig.5 ). Using the data for the average volume at each level and the average price difference between levels one easily reconstructs the average virtual impact curve. From Fig. 6 one concludes that the virtual price impact ∆p(N) of a market order is a nonlinear function of the order size N. Similar results were observed for the limit order book at the Stockholm Stock Exchange by Niemeyer and Sandas (see Fig. 8 in [11] ). To have a concise formula for ∆p(N) we fit it to the power law ∆p(N) ∼ N δ . The exponent δ in this fit fluctuated between 1.7 and 2.2 in different data sets. In Ref. [12] it was argued that the price impact function should have an exponent δ = 0.5. This conjecture was later used in several models to arrive at the empirically observed value of the exponent α of the fat tails of the histogram of price fluctuations. Our virtual market impact function characterized by δ ≃ 2 has the opposite convexity compared to that with δ = 0.5. We attribute this discrepancy to the difference between virtual and real market impacts, where the latter is dramatically softened by actions of speculators.
The subject of speculators brings us directly to the last question we addressed using our data: can one use the information contained in the order book to predict the magnitude and direction of price changes in the near future? Many seasoned day traders would answer yes to this question. From the law of supply and demand one expects that a significant excess of limit orders to sell above limit orders to buy (excess supply of stock) would push the price down while in the opposite case the price would go up. It means that a speculator who has access to the current state of the order book can predict (and use this prediction for his/her profit) the direction of price change in the near future. The practical applicability of this strategy is limited by the fact that all NAS-DAQ traders have at least 2 routers between them and the 'order-matching 5 . The average number of shares offered in limit orders at a given level as a function of the level number. Negative levels correspond to limit orders to buy (bids), while positive to limit orders to sell (asks).
queue.' Each router introduces a network delay. The induced delay may be greater than the deterministic correlation timespan. In this work we made no attempt to see if deterministic correlations existed in 'real time' while data was being collected. The first way to measure the short term predictability of market price from our data is to concentrate on those moments in time when the total number of shares contained in limit orders to sell and limit orders to buy differ by a significant number of shares. In principle this amount should be selected proportional to the average daily volume of transactions for each particular stock, yet in our calculations we fixed it to be 10000 shares for each of the stocks in our data sets. Also, we looked only at the imbalance between volumes offered at highest bid and lowest ask prices. For one of our data sets we checked that if higher levels are included our conclusions remain qualitatively the same. We then averaged the evolution of price immediately after the moment of large excess demand (or supply) over all events when this excess was realized. In Fig. 7 one can see that indeed as can be expected from the law of supply and demand an excess demand drives the price up, while an excess supply drives it down. In our data set this predictability of future prices lasts only for a few minutes (even for 30 seconds for some of the stocks). Therefore, speculators who want to use this effect need to act quickly and to have a very fast and reliable connection to main computers at NASDAQ. Yet another way . The virtual impact of a market order calculated from the density of limit orders in the order book. Negative x corresponds to market orders to sell, while positive -to market orders to buy. Solid lines are an attempt to fit the data with the power law form. The exponent δ of the best fit was close to 2 in both cases.
to visualize the effect of the imbalance of supply and demand on future prices is to calculate the average change in price of the stock during a fixed time interval ∆t conditioned at a certain value of the imbalance of the order book before the change. In Fig.8 we plot the average 1-minute price change as a function of the initial imbalance of limit orders at the highest bid/lowest ask levels. This plot once again confirms that the influence of the state of the order book on future prices is a real and sizable effect. At our level of statistical errors it appears that the price change scales approximately linearly with the excess supply (or demand).
In conclusion, we have presented an empirical study of statistical properties of a limit order book using the high frequency data collected in the NASDAQ Level II system. It was observed that the distribution of market (or marketable limit) orders has power law tails characterized by an exponent 1 + µ market = 2.4 ± 0.1. The distribution of limit order sizes is also consistent with a power law with an exponent close to 2. However, it was found that a log-normal distribution gives a better fit to the cumulative distribution of limit order sizes over a wider range. The depth of the order book measured as a virtual price impact of a hypothetical large market order was found to be a non-linear function of its size. This non-linearity is primarily due to the decay in the density of limit orders (quotes) away from the most recent transaction price. In reality though this virtual impact is probably much softened by actions of speculators, so that the convexity of the non-linear part may even change its sign. A large imbalance in the number of limit orders at the highest bid and lowest ask sides of the book leads to the deterministic price changes which are in accord with intuitive notions regarding supply and demand. This effect seems to disappear at a time scale of several minutes. The short-term average price change linearly depends on the imbalance in the total volume of limit orders at the inside bid and ask prices. These empirical findings may prove to be useful in narrowing down the list of models, used to explain the set of stylized facts about market price fluctuations. Even more importantly, this work may shift the attention of the econophysics community towards more realistic order book based price formation mechanisms. The work is currently underway to add some of the observed empirical features to the simple toy model of order-driven markets proposed by one of us in Ref. [8] . In particular we plan to check the effect that broad (power law) distributions of limit and market order sizes would have on the critical exponents of this model. price(t+1min)−price(t) ($) Fig. 8 . The average price change one minute after an excess supply or demand was observed as a function of the excess demand, i.e. volume at the lowest ask minus volume at the highest bid.
